Political resistance to European integration in the United Kingdom laid important ideological foundations for contemporary English nationalism. The politics surrounding accession to the EEC was such that it signaled that accession was both a matter of supreme national importance and via the device of a referendum it led to the fusing of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty. The unfolding of the Thatcherite project in Britain added an individualistic -and eventually an antiEuropean -dimension to this nascent English nationalism. Resistance to the deepening political and monetary integration of Europe, coupled with the effects of devolution in the United Kingdom, led to the emergence of a populist English nationalism, by now fundamentally shaped by opposition to European integration, although a nationalism which merged the defence of British and English sovereignty. Underpinning these three developments was a popular version of the past which saw "Europe" as the ultimate institutional expression of British decline. Thus Euroscpeticism generated the ideology of contemporary English nationalism by legitimising the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty through the invocation of popular sovereignty underpinned by reference to the past.
Introduction
They key to understanding English nationalism is not to search for anything which expresses itself as distinctively English in the realm of politics. This is because a central element of English nationalism is the defence of sovereignty -that is, the defence of the United Kingdom's sovereignty. Certainly there are some minor campaigns which seek to redress the asymmetric devolution of the United Kingdom, but the ideology of English nationalism is not generated in the main by this sort of resentment. Although devolution played an important part in creating the structural conditions necessary to imagine England as a distinct political community, the ideological content of contemporary English nationalism is generated by opposition to European integration. By defending the United Kingdom's sovereignty against the encroaching powers of the European Union, English nationalists often obscure English nationalism by defending Britain. This is not to say that English nationalism is necessarily 'quiescent' or even 'non-existent', but rather that Euroscpeticism informs and illuminates nationalism in England, providing the ideological content of contemporary English nationalism.
The argument that follows consists of three pillars, resting on a fourth foundation:
1. The politics surrounding accession to the Common Market was such that it signaled that accession was both a matter of supreme national importance and -via the device of a referendum -led to the fusing of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty; varied. They range from research demonstrating that there is an active hostility to English identity amongst the young (Fenton, 2007) ; to the notion that England is imagined as a void or absence (Abell et al, 2007);  or that English nationalism exists but dare not speak its name (McCrone, 2006) ; or that it exists but it is politically weak (Bryant, 2008) and even to the notion that England is actually dead (Scruton, 2001) . Each of these explanations has merit -some more than others -yet many of these studies focus on what we might call English identity as opposed to English nationalism. Kumar alone seeks to address the content of English nationalism, only to conclude that there never was anything resembling English nationalism until recently thereby inhibiting the development of a English national consciousness (Kumar, 2003) . Anthony Smith has called for a longer-term historical analysis of English nationalism in the context of European unity (Smith, 2006) and this is an area which certainly needs to be further explored. Only Gifford has examined the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism, but with an emphasis on Britain and its political economy (Gifford, 2008) . As I will argue below, resistance to European integration has laid the ideological foundations of a contemporary English nationalism by legitimising the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty through the invocation of popular sovereignty. However, with one or two minor exceptions such as the Campaign for an English Parliament (CEP), the ideology of contemporary English nationalism is not explicitly borne by an understanding of politics, but is instead carried implicitly in an understanding of the past. An analysis of the role that arguments about the past -and lessons to be learned from them -played in resistance to European integration highlight the links between contemporary English nationalism and Euroscepticism. But the dominant understanding of the past in England is a vision of history where the notion of "Greatness" has been torpedoed by perceptions of "Decline" in the post-War era -and "Europe" can be all too easily seen as the institutional expression of this fall from great power status This is not to say that other considerations did not contribute to a sceptical attitude towards European integration prior to the 1970s.
Some of these objections were based on nothing more than prejudice and hearsay. In a draft pamphlet, entitled Into the EEC? businessman A G Elliot argued against joining the EEC on the following grounds:
I visited France on a 2,000 mile business trip and everywhere (except among the peasants) I found half the companies and people I dealt with tried to cheat me. As a recent television programme proved this sort of thing does not happen to foreign visitors to England… and while I have spoken about the French, people tell me
Italians are worse' (Letter/pamphlet from A G Elliot to Shore, SHORE/9/44 [Miscellaneous, 1971.] ).
Such attitudes cannot be dismissed lightly since we know that "othering"
plays an important part in the generation of collective identities (Cohen, 1991: 197 Together we stand at the crossroads of history. The SECOND BATTLE OF BRITAIN is immanent. In the mystical sense, am I to be that stranger from New Zealand standing on a broken arch of London Bridge to gaze upon the ruins of St Paul's?' (Weal, 1971) But whilst these Commonwealth ties were important in the 1960s and '70s, they were not crucial in the emergence of a specifically English (Leighton, 1971: 13) . But sovereignty could not be understood in isolation from history.
Leighton continued:
Our present liberties and freedoms in Britain were fought for and achieved by our forefathers in a long struggle which included such milestones as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Chartist movement, the various reform bills, women's suffrage, and so on. Our present MPs have inherited these rights and liberties, and now they are custodians responsible for handing them on to future generations. They certainly have no mandate to surrender or abandon our right to self-government and self-determination to the apparatus in Brussels and would never be forgiven for doing so (Leighton, 1971: 13 has pointed out, the notion of popular sovereignty inherent in a referendum sits strangely with the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty which was the ostensible goal of the Anti-marketeers (Forster, 2002: 92) .
Nevertheless, a referendum on continued UK involvement under renegotiated terms of accession was part of the Labour manifesto in both elections of 1974 and after their second victory of that year a date for a referendum was duly set for 6 June 1975.
However, it was the outspoken ex-Conservative MP Enoch Powell who made some of the most explicit links between national identity and sovereignty during the referendum campaign. Speaking on Radio Three in the run-up to the referendum, Powell -already habituated to defending the English people's sovereignty against New Commonwealth immigrants -argued that 'parliamentary sovereignty is the form in which we are accustomed to asserting our national independence,' adding that Parliamentary sovereignty was also 'the fact for which men have fought and died, that the laws in their country are made only by the institutions of their country and in Britain that they are made only by the parliamentary institutions of our country' (Powell, 1975) . And even though many of the arguments on the left stemmed from a sceptical attitude towards the EEC's capitalist and Christian Democratic credentials, even figures such as Tony Benn could comprehend the EEC's lack of appeal in Britain through an understanding of the inviolability of Britain's borders since 1066 and portray it as a recreation of the Holy Roman Empire (Benn, 1971) .
What emerged stronger out of these debates during the first half of the 1970s was an understanding of Englishness founded upon and articulated around a sense of the uniqueness of Parliament, as well as its historical formation, longevity and continuity throughout the travails of the twentieth century. This continuity could not be understood by
Continental Europeans who, in the words of the anti-Market National Referendum Campaign, were 'more used to giving up their institutions than we are' (National Referendum Campaign, 1975: 5) . These understanding of England's past were turned into a populist issue by the referendum of 1975. This unusual innovation in British politics was ostensibly to allow the people to decide this issue of supreme national importance. However, it was also designed to preserve the Labour Party from splitting over the issue of Europe (Hennessy, 2001: 365) . In short, Prime Minister Wilson was far more concerned with Labour unity than European unity. Thus to keep the government together the electorate found itself confronted with arguments that were presented as being of such national significance that only "the people" could decide. To be sure the Anti-Marketeers failed in their objective of securing Britain's withdrawal from the EEC, losing the referendum in June 1975 by a margin of almost 2:1 (Blair, 2005: 47) . Ultimately, the Anti-Marketeers' key argument that the referendum was about 'whether or not we remain free to rule ourselves in our own way' (National Referendum Campaign, 1975 : 2) did not carry as much force as the government-backed campaign for a Yes vote which downplayed the threat to sovereignty and emphasized material concerns:
Today we are even more dependent on what happens outside. Our trade, our jobs, our food, our defence cannot wholly be within our own control. That is why so much of the argument about sovereignty is a false one… If we came out the And in a Britain where memories of wartime want still lingered, arguments about basic material prosperity -'Britain, as a country which cannot feed itself, will be safer in the Community which is almost selfsufficient in food' -were persuasive (Britain in Europe, 1975: 6) .
Nevertheless, these debates of the early 1970s gave political salience to a popular version of national identity linked to Parliamentary sovereignty.
But there was a caveat; Parliament's sovereignty extended beyond the borders of England, a legacy of the United Kingdom's political development which helped conflate and confuse England and Britain.
With England being what Arthur Aughey has termed 'an absorptive patria' (Aughey, 2007) Englishness and Britishness were still commonly merged.
It would take a further intensification of anti-European attitudes, plus the strengthening of nationalisms in other parts of Britain, to begin to disentangle English nationalism from the defence of British sovereignty.
II
The Conservative Party's weakening commitment to European integration is well documented. As Andrew Geddes points out, Conservative support for Europe was predicated on a 'rather narrow trade-based idea of European integration that was unlikely to be adaptable to the ambitious programmes for political and economic integration which were launched in the 1980s' (Geddes, 2004: 192 In her attempt to radicalize and modernize both the Conservative Party and Britain, the EEC initially seemed to be on the right side of history for
Thatcher. The past -especially the Victorian era -was never a foreign country for Margaret Thatcher; in fact the past was Britain. But it was a past that served as an inspiration for contemporary renewal. 'The time is ripe for a new radicalism' argued Thatcher to her Party in 1977, but cautioned that her version of the past was not nostalgic, nor an attempt to turn back the clock to Britain's imperial heyday:
On the contrary, we are trying to start the clock up again, to move forward with Europe. This is not going back to the nineteenth century, but trying to restore the economic and social momentum we had in the nineteenth century and adapt it to present needs (Thatcher, 1977a) .
Negative attitudes towards European integration ultimately developed out of the "battle of ideas" over the relationship between the state and individual in Britain, which were only latterly applied to the development of the European Community. Thatcher outlined some of her early ideas - The absolute monarchs which emerged in some European countries out of the feudal order considered it their duty to regulate and initiate. If they did not encourage commerce and manufacture -they believed there would be none. They never stopped to ask themselves whether their heavy hand did not in fact inhibit spontaneous growth (Thatcher, 1977b ).
All of this was designed to win over the Party and electorate to the neo- England, only more so. But its subtly different intellectual and political climate made it much more resistant to the politics, if not the policies, of Thatcherism (Marr, 1995: 168) .
From 1987, Scots opinion formers and the electorate began to move away from the Conservative Party. Responding to this growing disaffection, the Scottish Constitutional Convention issued a Claim of Right, arguing that 'we have a government which openly boasts its contempt for consensus and a constitution which allows it to demonstrate that contempt in practice' (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 23) . So the problem was not just Thatcherism and the Conservative Party alone, but Britain too.
The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly endorsed the idea that 'the United
Kingdom is a political artifact put together at English insistence. If it is to continue, it must work for its living and justify its existence' parliamentary sovereignty, the common law, our traditional sense of fairness, our ability to run our own affairs in our own way' might be 'subordinated to a remote European bureaucracy, resting on very different traditions' (Thatcher, 1995: 743) .
Further developments within the member states of the EC during the late 1980s, notably German re-unification, also revealed and contributed to a conflation of xenophobia and Eurosceptic ideas. Margaret Thatcher's meeting to discuss the German national character at Chequers in March 1990 and Nicholas Ridley's description of the EC as 'German racket' illustrated suspicions still resting on the experience of fighting Germany during the twentieth century (Ramsden, 2006: 405) . According to Thatcher, since 1871 Germany had been veering 'unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt' and containing post-War Germany within the framework of European unity was not a way to solve "the German problem" but was only bound to exacerbate it (Thatcher, 1995: 791 fonctionnaires 'hatred of Britain and the individual freedom it stands for is a religion' (Johnson, 1992) . In language ironically resembling those in favour of a devolved Scottish parliament, Conservative Eurosceptics spoke out against the erosion of democracy entailed by being an underrepresented and poorly understood part of a centralizing political union.
Thus the process of European integration heightened a sense of distinctiveness around the issue of sovereignty. Writing in The European
Journal, the publication of the Eurosceptic European Foundation,
Stephen Hill elaborated a divide between Britons and Germans in relation to sovereignty, the law and rights, attitudes which had become habits of mind:
…our constitution (which has evolved continuously for 781 years) is in an unwritten form and depends on duties. Our monarch is surrounded by an aura of mystery that reflects the ineffable relationship between the metaphysical Form of Sovereignty and the manifest sovereign. In Britain, we believe our liberty is protected in the belief of the Idea of Liberty itself… Germans believe the exact opposite. They accept that law is made by the president of the people and is worked out in advance and is written down. Similarly, the constitution (they are on their fifth in 125 years) must be written down. Their liberty, as they see it, is protected by their "Basic Rights" enshrined in a legal code (Hill, 1996:13 Problem" had the potential to 'destabilize Europe and the world well into the next millennium' (Cash and Duncan Smith, 1996: 39) . Philip Resnick has referred to this type of nationalism as one characterised by "hubris" -'an overweening pride in one's own national community' usually found in the national majorities of formerly imperial states; an attitude which he contrasts with the 'melancholy' of national minorities (Resnick, 2008: 789-90) . In England the ideological content of a putative English nationalism had already formed around Euroscepticism, or at least Euroscepticism was broad enough to accommodate the opinions of those who resented bureaucratic regulation, open borders and foreign erosion of the United Kingdom's sovereignty -all understood as "national decline". The expression of that ideology might best be summed up by combining Resnick's two descriptors and concluding that English nationalism in the early twentyfirst century could be described as "hubristically melancholic", where a nostalgia for the past combined with an increasingly organised and popular anti-European politics.
In January 1998, four months after the successful referenda establishing devolution in Scotland and Wales, a Private Member's Bill on the creation of an English parliament was tabled by Teresa Gorman MP. Gorman was a prominent Eurosceptic, one of the so-called "Euro Rebels" who had lost the whip in 1995 over the issue of the UK's financial contribution to EU.
Gorman might be described at this time as "reluctantly English": she had no particular desire to see the United Kingdom divided up into its national constituents, fearing that this might make the UK easier to govern from Brussels' point of view, but she felt that devolution had changed things. Gorman stated that despite calling for an English parliament, she was in fact a Unionist. But New Labour's policies had forced her hand and she demanded that the English receive 'fair and equal treatment', noting in passing that nine out of the twenty ministers Callaghan, Thatcher or Major being able to pronounce rosbif let alone conduct a whole speech in another language). During New Labour's term in office, there were attempts to contain narratives of Britain's past in a
European framework, but ultimately the search for greatness emphasized the fact that past grandeur seemed unobtainable either within the context of European integration or as America's junior partner (Gamble, 2003) .
Relations with European partners seemed utterly convivial at first.
Speaking to Dutch dignitaries early on in his premiership, Tony Blair emphasized the long-term strength of Anglo-Dutch relations, stating that there had been amity between the nations for centuries despite a few 'naval misunderstandings' (Blair, 1998) . Even though this was evidently a joke at the outset of his speech, the logic of subsuming European war and conflict to the safety of fraternal conflict also operated on large projects of commemoration -akin to Anderson's notion of the 'reassurance of fratricide' (Anderson, 1991: 197) . But there was another way of looking at this, and that was through the prism of a "core" and "non-core" Europe, with Britain definitely "noncore". This idea was given its greatest popular expression by the German contemporary Europe -especially in contrast to the United States -was the product of Europe's bellicose history and subsequent attempts to ensure that such calamities never took place again (Habermas and Derrida, 2005: 12) . By this reading of history, the US could never understand the pacific concerns that drove European integration; by extension, Britons could not really grasp this weltanshauung either. . This version of the past which privileged Britain's conflict with its continental neighbours was increasingly popularised through film, television, books, genealogy, commemoration and tourism (Ramsden, 2006: 363-92) .
At a political level, it was still hard to discern a mass nationalism that was explicitly English (the Campaign for an English parliament and the English Constitutional Convention had limited support: Bryant, 2008: 670) . At a cultural level this was less true. It was the display of the Cross of St George at international football tournaments which was the most obvious sign of this growing Englishness. This widening of support for England was not necessarily accompanied by a deepening of English national identity (see Fenton, 2007; Abell et al, 2007) . But what the development of support for the England team did from the mid-1990s
was to allow for a mass, popular expression of an identity which was exclusively and explicitly English rather than British; even if this identity was "non-political" in the sense that it was not linked to a programme of constitutional change. However there were signs that, when it came to the issue of Europe, an English nationalism that combined post-imperial melancholia with anti-European sentiment was emerging.
As noted by opinion pollsters back in 1975, most people did not vote for the UK's continuing involvement in the EEC out of any strong sense of conviction, but because they felt there was no other option available to them (Boase Massimi Pollitt Partnership. 1975 National Party, for which European integration has become (officially at least) an opportunity rather than a threat: (Ichijo, 2004: 43-58) . 
Conclusion
The links between Euroscepticism and English nationalism are especially significant for several reasons. The first is that debates about the United Kingdom's accession to the EEC and its continuing level of involvement English nationalism, but it is an English nationalism which still characteristically speaks the language of Britishness.
